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Suppression Prior to Indictment of Confessions
Unconstitutionally Obtained
Another protective measure has been established regarding confessions
in federal cases. In the recent case of In re Fried, a circuit court of
appeal held that a confession obtained in violation of constitutional pro-
visions may be suppressed by an independent proceeding in equity prior
to indictment or any other criminal court proceeding.1  The petitioners
in this instance were seized by federal officers on suspicion of stealing a
carload of rubber bound for overseas shipment by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. They were taken into immediate custody without
arraignment and without being permitted to call attorneys. After alleged
extended periods of abusive grilling, they signed confessions. Subse-
quently, though no indictment had been returned, they petitioned in
equity for suppression of the confessions and for return of documentary
evidence seized at the time of their arrest. The court refused to consider
any evidence with regard to the alleged illegality of the confessions.
2
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, but not without a
forceful dissent by one judge who was unwilling to deviate from the pre-
vailing practice of waiting- until actual trial to consider the validity of
confessions.
8
The significance of the decision is not concerned with the vexing prob-
lem which so frequently has troubled courts in the past; that is, under
what circumstances are one's constitutional or statutory rights violated ?4
Instead, the principal question is confined to a determination of what
point in judicial proceedings can an unconstitutionally obtained confes-
sion be forever suppressed for evidential purposes.
5
Apparently this is the first case, state or federal, to hold that such
confessions may be suppressed before any criminal proceedings are com-
menced, or even after indictment but before trial. Though the factual
situation arises .rarely, one federal case allowed suppression where the
1 In re Fried, 161 F. (2d) 453 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) (Certiorari granted: 331 U. S.
804). A substantial part of the opinion dealt with evidence of alleged illegality of
the documentary seizure. The ensuing discussion does not deal with this aspect of
the case. Each of the three judges took a different view of the case, one wishing to
suppress all confessions secured in violation of either the statutory or constitutional
rights of the accused. Another wished to extend it only to violations of constitutional
rights; this composed the majority decision. The third was unwilling to make any
extension of the prevailing doctrine because he feared undue obstruction of public
prosecutions.
2 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y., 1946).
s People v. Reed, 333 Ill. 397, 164 N.E. 847 at 851 (1928).
4McNabb et al. v. U.S., 318 U. S. 332 (1942); Note (1947) 38 J. Crim L. &
Criminology 136.
5 The United States Supreme Court is to consider that question also, since cer-
tiorari has been granted in the Fried case, 331 U.S. 804 (1947).
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question of timeliness of the attempt to suppress was not raised.6 In
another case where the question was squarely before the court on an
equivalent set of facts, the result reached was directly opposite the one
in the instant case. 7 Several state courts have denied such relief when
requested after indictment but before trial.8 Normally (where no indict-
ment had been returned) these suits arise by a petition in equity for a
perpetual injunction against the public prosecutor from using the con-
fession or any information gained thereunder in any criminal action
involving the petitioner.9 If an indictment is pending, the procedure
is usually by preliminary motion to suppress before the trial court.' 0
The reasons for denying these motions and petitions have been twofold:
that equity has no jurisdiction to stay, meddle in or impede criminal
proceedings, and that the trial court, where the complete situation will
be presented, is the only place where a fair decision may be made as to
whether the rights of the accused were violated."
Essentially the same questions arise in proceedings for the preliminary
suppression and return of tangible evidence such as documents, books,
materials or equipment which are illegally seized. As with confession
cases, these suits arise upon an equity petition, where no indictment has
been returned, or by a preliminary motion in advance of trial if an indict-
ment is pending.' 2 The prevailing practice here (in jurisdictions fol-
lowing the federal view of inadmissibility of illegally seized evidence)
is that tangible objects may be suppressed as evidence and returned
regardless of whether an indictment is pending,13 though there is still an
6 U. S. v. Pollack, 64 F. Supp. 554 (C.D.N.J., 1946) (Motion for suppression of
tangible evidence and written statements made after indictment but before trial;
granted, but specific question of timeliness with respeet to the statements not raised.)
7 Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F. (2d) 788 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938). (Bill in equity against
U.S. District Attorney and Special Agent of U. S. Revenue Service for decree en-
joining 'respondents from using as evidence the sworn testimony delivered by peti-
tioner to the agent during certain income tax investigations. No indictment was
pending.) Cert denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
8 Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind 476, 13 N.E. (2d) 524 (1938); People v. Reed, 333
IM. 397, 164 N.E. 847 (1928); People v. Nentarz, 142 Misc. 477, 254 N.Y.S. 574
(1931).
9 Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F. (2d) 788 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938).
1o People v. Reed, 333 Ill. 397, 164 N.E. 847 (1928).
1' As to the denial of equitable jurisdiction: Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F. (2d)
788 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938) ; as to determination before the trial court: U. S. v. Lydecker,
275 F. 976 at 978 (W.D.N.Y., 1921).
12 Go-Bart Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
13 The Supreme Court first discarded the Common Law rule that evidence is not
rendered inadmissible because of being unlawfully obtained in Boyd v. U. S., 116
U. S. 616 at 638 (1886). This new doctrine received a temporary setback in Adams
v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904) which reaffirmed the Common Law Rule and
confined the Boyd case to its facts. Later, however, the court approved the method
of obtaining a federal court order for the return of illegally seized evidence before
trial, Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 38.3 (1914), and this procedure has been accepted
generally ever since. Goodman v. Lane, 48 F. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931); Bueari
et al v. Fili, 31 F. Supp 433 (M.D. Pa., 1940). Accord, where power to suppress
before indictment recognized: Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921); Perlman
v. U. 5., 247 U. S. 7 (1918); Foley v. U. S., 64 F. (2d) I (C.C.A. 5th, 1933);




occasional case to the contrary.14
The inconsistency of the rules as to tangible and intangible (confes-
sion) evidence up to the instant case is apparent. There would seem to
be no distinction in the nature of the evidence which would justify pre-
indictment suppression in the one type of ease and not in the other,
although at least one court has attempted to explain away the inconsist-
ency on this basis.' 5 Historically, however, there has been a difference in
the development of the doctrines by which these types of evidence are
rendered inadmissible. 16 The rule against admission of tangible evidence
obtained through illegal search and seizure seems to spring from a sup-
posed overlap of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ;17 that is, since the
Fourth Amendment forbids illegal search and seizure, the use of evidence
thereby obtained is (according to an interpretation which has been criti-
cized as historically incorrect 18 ) self-incriminatory within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.19 On the other hand, the rule against involuntary
confessions is older and springs from different considerations. At com-
mon law, as well as upon due process considerations, confessions obtained
through the use of force or inducement were regarded to be so untrust-
worthy that they were excluded as incompetent. 20  Thus Wigmore,
along with a majority of the authorities, condemns the use of voluntari-
ness alone as the test of a confession's admissibility as both historically
incorrect and inadequate. He rejects the view that there is an associa-
tion between the confession rule and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and points out the fact that in point of time the origin of the con-
fession rule and the privilege are widely separated.2 1 On the other hand,
Dean McCormick and others find a kinship between the confession rule
and the privilege against self-incrimination. They see in the test of
voluntariness an indication that the rules restricting the use of confes-
sions are prompted by a desire to protect the subject against torture, as
well as by a desire to safeguard the trustworthiness of the evidence.2 2 But
whatever the answer may be to this spirited conflict, it is sufficient for
the purpose here to note briefly that as to historical development, the
confession rule has been different in both point of time and substance
than the rule as to illegal searches and seizures.
14 Imperiale v. Perkins, 66 F. (2d) 805 (Ct. Ap. D. C., 1933). (Where
alien filed petition against Labor Department for suppression of evidence il.
legally seized; distinguishable since district court has no jurisdiction over adminis-
trative agencies during pendency of proceedings there.) U. S. v. Oruber, ... F.
(2d) ... (S.D.N.Y., 1947). (Evidence obtained by wire tapping not excluded
before indictment because no way to determine whether prosecutor intended to
use same in criminal proceedings.)
15 Eastus v. Bradshaw, 94 F. (2d) 788 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938).
16 See 3 Wig-more, Evidence §817-823; 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2183 (3rd. Ed, 1940).
17 U. S. Coast. Amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated ... " U. S. Const. Amend. V: " . . . nor shall (persons) be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of ... liberty
without due process of law."
18 Note (1947) 37 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 417, 418.
19 Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1921); Note (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Crimi-
nology 136.
20 People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 386 (1857).
21 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence (1940) §§823-827: 2266.
22See McCormick, C. T., "The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence"
(1918) 16 Texas L. Rev. 447 at pp. 452-457. See also McCormick, C. T., "Some




The difference in historical development, however, is not persuasive as
justifying present day inconsistency in the two doctrines of admissibility.
Whether confessions are excluded because of untrustworthiness or viola-
tion of constitutional rights, the point is that they will be excluded. The
issue is, therefore, should involuntary confessions be excluded prior to
indictment as tangible evidence is, or should the test of their validity wait
for determination at the actual trial ?
Arguments against pre-indictment suppression of tangible evidence
have been nearly identical with those used against confessions. As pre-
viously stated, in tangible evidence cases equitable jurisdiction has been
questioned ;23 the view that prosecutions might be impeded seriously has
been submitted ;24 and it has been stated that the trial court is the best
place to make a fair determination of the issue.25 These arguments were
overcome, however, and now even the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedu're provide for motions in advance of trial for the return of books,
papers, and other tangible objects unlawfully seized and for the sup-
pression of their use as evidence. 26 Moreover, if the defendant fails to
make a pre-trial motion his objection is considered waived, 27 unless,
of course, he was unaware of the illegality of the seizure. 28 The federal
rules, however, make no provision for pre-trial suppression of unlawfully
obtained confessions.
Since there seems to be no justification, in legal principle, for allowing
the pre-indictment or pre-trial suppression of tangible evidence while at
the same time disallowing similar motions regarding confessions, are
there sufficient practical reasons for sustaining a rule making a motion
to suppress an unconstitutionally obtained confession depend upon
whether an indictment has been returned or upon whether the trial is in
progress?
The strongest argument against suppression is that prosecution of pub-
lic offenders will be hampered. This is undeniable, for there can be
little doubt that dilatory motions will be increased by such a rule and
that prosecutors will have the burden of defending their activities in
sepLrate and additional proceedings. It is not unanswerable, however,
for we may point to the existence of the tangible evidence rule for sev-
eral years which has meant increased dilatory motions and additional
burdens to prosecuLtions. Yet the prosecutors seem to function effectively,
which would seem to indicate that the extension here in question would
not add an unbearable burden. Moreover, because there are far more
searches and seizures than there are guilty or innocent persons who con-
fess, the use of this doctrine is probably more widespread than would be
a similar doctrine applied to confessions. Furthermore, if the principal
basis of a prosecution is a confession, perhaps some prosecutors would
welcome an opportunity to test its validity in advance. A pre-indietment
determination of invalidity might well save a great amount of time in
preparing a case for indictment and trial. It may indicate to the prose-
23 Bucari v. Fill, 31 F. Supp. 433 (M. D. Pa., 1940).
24 Goodman v. Lane, 48 P. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931).
25 Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
26 Rule 41 (e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, 18 U.S.C.A. §687 (Supp. 1947).
27 Segurola v. U. S., 275 U. S. 106 (1927); Durkin v. U. S., 62 F. (2d) .305
(C.C.A. 1st, 1933). Contra: Samson v. U. S., 26 F. (2d) 769 (C.C.A. 1st, 1928).
(Motion made immediately after jury sworn in not too late.)
28 Agnello v. U. S., 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
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cutor that it is futile to continue the case, thus saving a tremendous
amount of work, or show him that he must find Other substantial evidence
in order that his case may stand.
As to the argument that the trial court is the best place to make an
accurate determination, this would be a material factor only if the pre-
liminary proceeding is of a most summary nature. There seems to be
no reason why an effective presentation of all the facts and circumstances
necessary for a fair decision cannot be made in a preliminary proceed-
ing. Assuming that more time will be required, especially if the court
follows Wigmore's theory of excluding confessions only if they are un-
trustworthy, 29 for this necessitates an exhaustive presentation of the per-
tinent circumstances as well as collateral matters, the preliminary pro-
ceeding nevertheless has the advantage of- evidence freshness which may
mean a more accurate picture of all conditions. And if the primary
interest is full protection to the accused, the additional time argument is
not entitled to persuasive weight.
As to the equitable power argument, the law is now settled that equity
may stay a criminal prosecution. 30 Even if this were not true, pre-indict-
ment suppression in federal courts could be obtained through use of the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the administration of justice
in the inferior federal courts.31
The great advantage of pre-indictment suppression of involuntary
confessions is the protection of the individual. That a wrongful indict-
ment works a tremendous hardship on an individual hardly can be
denied.32 Even though he be exonerated completely at a later date, his
reputation has suffered, he has the burden of a time consuming defense,
and some of the stigma will remain. Another possible advantage to the
general public would be the imposition of more civilized standards of
conduct on federal police officers. This apparently has been an objective
of the Supreme Court in its recent holdings rejecting involuntary con-
fessions,33 though the effect of these decisions on the individual police
officer has been discounted.34 But even a slight improvement is a step in
the right direction. Furthermore, federal criminal procedure will be
clarified by doctrinal consistency. Of course, consistency could be worked
in reverse by overruling the doctrine that tangible evidence may be sup-
29 State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15 NW (2d) 585 (1944).
30 The dissenting judge in the instant case readily acknowledged that tangible
evidence may be suppressed by independent equity proceeding prior to indictment,
161 F. (2d) 453 at 466 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947), as well as tlie fact that it would be logi-
caUy consistent to extend that rule to confessions illegally obtained. He felt, however,
that practical considerations (impediment to prosecutions) were more important
than logical consistency.
31 McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332 (1942).
32 See Judge Frank's persuasive opinion in instant case, 161 F. (2d) 453 (C.C.A.
2d, 1947) at pp. 459 & 465.
33 McNabb v. U. S., 318 U. S. 332 (1942). And U. S. v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65
(1944) which limited the broad rule expressed in the McNabb case to situations in
which the illegal detention of the accused itself acts as an inducement in the pro-
curing of the confession, in which case the confession probably would be untrust-
worthy. Asheraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944). (See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion.)
34 Warner, "How Can The Third Degree Be Eliminated," (1940), 1 Bill of
Rights Review 24. (Abstention from "third degree" methods depends on police
ability to protect society without them.)
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